MOR 20.5 Abstracts
Coevolution of SOEs and the Chinese Economy: The Roles of SOE Heterogeneity from the Institutional, Strategic, and Organizational Perspectives
Kenneth G. Huang, Runtian Jing, Jun Xia, Cyndi Man Zhang, Weiguo Zhong and David H. Zhu
Abstract
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China play a critical role in national economic development and the country’s positioning on the global stage. Chinese SOEs have undergone substantial transformations from traditional government-run entities to a variety of corporate forms exhibiting different levels of state involvement. Despite their substantial influence, the internal diversity of SOEs – from wholly state-owned to mixed-ownership – has not been thoroughly examined. This paper provides an overview of SOEs’ critical roles in the Chinese economy, the relationship between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs), and the challenges of SOEs in different stages of Chinese economic development. It then introduces five research papers that explore the institutional, strategic, and organizational perspectives on how SOEs manage the dual pressures of state and market logic, respond to policy adjustments, tackle leadership challenges, and navigate current global trends such as digital transformation, technological innovation, and environmental sustainability. In this paper, we provide important implications for policy and managerial practices and highlight a future research agenda for the heterogeneity of Chinese SOEs, and how SOEs respond to these challenges in the evolving geopolitical landscape, adapt their strategies, and manage relationships with foreign governments and enterprises under such conditions.
Institutional Complexity and Corporate Environmental Investments: Evidence from China’s Mixed-Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
Huiying Li, Yu Chang, Xinchun Wang and Nan Zhang
Abstract
While environmental concerns are increasingly driving firms’ strategic decisions, insights into why firms make heterogeneous environmental investments are limited. Taking an institutional view, we explore the effect of institutional complexity resulting from multiple but incongruent institutional logics within an organization on firms’ environmental investments. Using China’s mixed-ownership reform as a research context, we identify a unique condition in which institutional complexity arises as the privatization process results in two coexisting but incongruent institutional logics – namely, state and financial logic. We further propose that privatization plays both enabling and constraining roles in state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) strategic decisions about environmental investments, depending on the relative dominance of each institutional logic, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between privatization and environmental investments. Moreover, we examine the moderating effects of CEO background characteristics and firms’ external environmental context to uncover how these factors influence the relative dominance of state or financial logic in privatized SOEs, thereby reshaping SOEs’ environmental investments. Analyses of multisource panel data from Chinese listed SOEs from 2013 to 2020 support our theoretical propositions. The findings contribute to the literature on how institutional factors affect firm environmental practices and provide new insights to better understand the influence of institutional complexity on firm strategic actions.
‘Digital Divide’: How Do Central and Local SOEs Respond Differently to Digitalization in China
Xiaowei Rose Luo, Jun Wang, Shuangying Chen and Boyi Chen
Abstract
Despite the important role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in government policy implementation, there is a lack of research on how SOEs owned by different government entities differ. We draw on an attention-based view (ABV) to understand how central government-owned (called central SOEs) and local government-owned enterprises (called local SOEs) differ in their response to digitalization, a major state objective in China in recent years. The two types of SOEs differ in the foundational feature of attention structure – the rules of the game (as embodied in their different goals, identities, and evaluation of top executives) – as well as important features such as governance structures and resources. These features can trigger more attention in central SOEs to digitalization. Given the interdependence of these features in shaping the structural distribution of attention, we further propose how governance structures and resources can influence strategic attention differently in SOEs with different rules of the game. The arguments are tested using data from all Chinese-listed manufacturing SOEs between 2009 and 2020. The study reveals different responses to national strategy between central and local SOEs due to their distinct attention structures designed by the state. It also extends the ABV and research on corporate digital transformation.
Leadership Reconfiguration in State-Acquired Privately Owned Enterprises: A Paradox between Institutional Control and Agency
Yijie Min, Junyan Lu, Yunke Wu and Yanlong Zhang
Abstract
This study aims to explore the dynamics of leadership reconfiguration within emergent state-owned enterprises (SOEs), i.e., privately owned enterprises (POEs) that have been acquired by SOEs. From an institutional logic perspective, we argue that the emergence of these SOEs reflects a process in which POEs, previously dominated by market logic, incorporate state logic and transition to a hybrid form. However, this process presents a paradox for emergent SOEs: while a greater extent of reconfiguration of leadership helps them gain greater legitimacy in front of state-related institutional referents, it also results in greater conflicts between members adhering to different logics. To address this paradox, we theorize on the differences in the reconfigurations of the board and top management team (TMT) by respectively connecting their functions to institutional control and agency, two typical forms of institutional power. Our analysis reveals that emergent SOEs tend to experience reconfiguration more in the board while less in TMT. Furthermore, we find that these main effects are moderated by the industrial state-ownership density and acquirees’ preacquisition political connections. Our study contributes to the SOE and M&A literature by highlighting the uniqueness of emergent SOEs arising from POE-to-SOE acquisitions. Additionally, we propose a strategy to reconcile legitimation and internal stabilizations during logic hybridizations, thereby contributing to the institutional logic literature.
Catch One and Lose Another? Executive Compensation Restriction and Corporate Social Responsibility in State-Owned Enterprises
Peng Ning, Fangmei Lu, Guoguang Wan and Liangding Jia
Abstract
This study examines how the managerial interpretation of incentive arrangement affects corporate engagement in social areas, as reflected in corporate social performance, from two interrelated perspectives: the political influence view and the normative agency view. Building the theoretical framework on state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives’ dual-career tracks perspective, we contend that economic factors (performance decline and relative pay gap) and political factors (socialist imprints and political career horizon) could divergently reshape the interpretation of incentive arrangement on corporate social performance. Using ‘Pay Ceiling Order’ as a quasi-natural experiment context, a secondary analysis, and a controlled experiment reveal that compensation restriction on top executives causes a decrease in corporate social performance. This relationship is weakened when there are stronger socialist imprints inherited by a focal firm and when the executives have a longer political prospect. In contrast, the relationship is strengthened when firms face severe performance declines and when the executives’ compensation is relatively lower than peers. The findings show that compensation is an indispensable incentive joining with political and economic factors, enabling SOEs to engage in social areas. We discuss the implications of understanding top executive incentives with incentive arrangements and how the government purpose influences top executive responses to compensation incentive in ways that matter for long-term social value.
Female Leadership and Corporate Acquisitions in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Danyang Zhu and Xu-Hong Li
Abstract
Research on female leadership has documented that female-led firms tend to engage in lower risk-taking activities than male-led firms and attributed it to females’ higher propensity for risk aversion. Nevertheless, this claim and its associated findings have been increasingly challenged. In this article, we address the unclear pattern of females’ risk preference in leadership by contextualizing the effect of chair gender on corporate acquisitions in the context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Drawing on expectancy violation theory, we propose that female chairs are more inclined to take risks when they operate in contexts that encourage female agency. We further explore self-affirmation mechanisms through two moderators: gender stereotype threats and self-efficacy. An analysis of chairs of 1,265 publicly listed SOEs in China from 2008 to 2020 supports predictions that female chairs are more likely than male chairs to engage in firm acquisitions. The effects are amplified under low levels of female executive representation and high levels of political appointments held by female chairs. The study shows that context determines how extensively gender affects risk-taking. It offers new insights into when and why female leaders exhibit higher levels of risk-taking in Chinese SOEs.